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ABSTRACT
The Change in Systematic Risk after the 9/11 Events: 
An Analysis of Restaurant Industry
by
KihimKim
Dr. Zheng Gu, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Hotel Administration 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The tragic events of September 11,2001 (the 9/11 events) have had a dramatic 
impact on all aspects of American society. Although all facets of U. S. society have been 
aGected by the September 11 attacks, it is hard to identify an industry that felt those 
efkcts more immediately than the hospitality industry. The aftermath of the events of 
9/11 has forced the hospitality industry to face a disastrous fact in terms of decreased 
customer demand. The purpose o f this study was to investigate whether the average 
systematic risk, or beta, o f the restaurant industry changed signihcantly after 9/11. More 
specihcally, this study examined the dif&rence in systematic risk of diGerent types of 
restaurants, such as Gne/casual dining restaurants, family restaurants, and fast food 
restaurants in the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 period. The Endings indicate that the systematic 
risk has not changed signiGcantly both for the restaurant industry and for each restaurant 
segment that was examined.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the tragic events of September 11,2001 (9/11) have had a 
dramatic impact on all aspects of American society. According to Emst and Young 
(2001) the immediate efkct of the disaster was to accelerate the contracEon of the U.S. 
economy, which was already languishing in the months before the events of 9/11. Soon 
after the events of 9/11, forecasters projected a slowdown in Gross DomesEc Product 
(GDP) of 1.4 percent or more in the third quarter o f2001, slashing growth to minus 0.9 
percent and moving the economy gradually into a recession. The U.S. NaEonal Income 
and Product Accounts (2003) estimated the losses to property hom the 9/11 events at 
approximately $16 billion, just over 0.15 percent o f the annual GDP.
Although all facets ofU.S. society have been afkcted by the events of 9/11, it is 
hard to cite an industry that has felt those eGects more immediately than the hospitality 
industry (O 'Neill & Lloyd-Jones, 2001). Since the 9/11 events, there have been many 
arEcles about its effects on various industries. The hospitality industry is no excepEon to 
the scrutiny of the impact of 9/11. The aftermath of 9/11 has forced the hospitality 
industry to face some hard facts in terms of decreased customer demand. Queiroz (2002) 
suggested that hospitality companies have been challenged with reducEons in corporate 
travel, canceled convenEons, employee layoffs, declining consumer conEdence, 
corporate reorganizaEons, and insurance coverage volaElity. According to the Fiscal
1
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Policy InsEtute (2001), Eie New York City economy was expected to lose an estimated 
108,500 jobs within the Erst month fbUowing the 9/11 as a direct result of the attack on 
the World Trade Center. This is ^proximately 2.4 percent o f total local employment 
including full-Eme, part-time, and the self-employed. The greatest impact on New York 
City jobs as a result of the 9/11 events has been on the three industries of securiEes, retail 
trade, and restaurants. Numerous restaurants were destroyed, E)rced to close, or cut staff 
due to the spillover eGects on tourism and business travel.
The 9/11 attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., combined with the 
already weak domesEc economy, had an adverse impact on the U.S. restaurant industry. 
According to the Bureau of Labor StaEsEcs (2002), the restaurant industry lost 
qiproximately 103,000 jobs, nearly double the historical rate, due to slower sales because 
of the economic condiEons resulting Eom the September 11 terrorist attacks (Nolt &  
Kim, 2001). According to several restaurant execuEves at the 2002 mulE-unit 
Foodservice Operators Conference held in Orlando, Flonda, fallout Enm the 9/11 events 
has leA fbodservice operators in airport venues facing skyrocketing insurance rates and 
other operators investing substanEal resources to protect against future terrorist threats 
(Peters, 2002).
Hawawini and Viallet (1999) illustrated (Fig. 1) the transmission of risk Eom 
sales to proEts. Hawawini and Viallet also provided the relaEonship between earnings 
aAer taxes (EAT) and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and descnbed the risk of 
this relaEonship a s n s L  They also explained the relaEonship between EBIT and 
sales and descnbed the risk of this relaEonship as operaEowz/ nÆ  They further speciEed 
that sales Euctuated because of the uncertain economic, poliEcal, social, and compeEEve
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environment in which Grms operated. They characterized this risk, faced by all firms, as 
ecoMo/Mfc Hawawini and Viallet interpreted the cumulative effect o f economic risk 
and operational risk as rwAr.
«Economic condition 
«Political &  social 
environments
«Market structure 
«Firm's competitive 
position
Less variable
and
S A LE S fixed
expense
Less fixed 
interest
E arn in g : expenses E a rn in g :
before Interest and variab^ a fte r t a i
an d tm i tax cq)enses
f 1r
ECONOMIC RISK OPERATIONAL RISK
BUSINESS RISK FINANCIAL RISK
Adapted &om Hawawini and Viallet (1999)
Figure 1 Oraphical representation of economic, operational, and Gnancial risk
Hamada (1972) and Rubenstein (1973) demonstrated that operating risk and 
financial risk were the fundamental components of systematic risk. Strong (2001) 
extended their studies by suggesting that both operational risk and Gnancial risk migiht be 
empirically represented through the respective use of the degree of operating leverage 
(DOL) and the degree of financial leverage (DFL). GrifBn (2001) also expanded on their 
research by separating economic risk Gom business risk and presented empirically the 
economic risk construct through the use of the degree of economic leverage (DEL). 
GrifiGn proposed that the degree of economic leverage was an incremental addition to the 
explanation of systematic risk in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
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Systematic risk is deGned as the asset's return covariance with the market 
portfbho o f nsky assets. The speciGc measure of systematic risk used in the CAPM is 
called the asset's beta (P). Beta is Airther deGned as the covariance between the asset 
returns and market returns divided by the variance of the market returns. Because the 
Grm's returns are aGected by Grm sales, and variance of sales is attributed to GuctuaGons 
in the economy that result Gom uncertainGes in the economic, poliGcal, social, and 
compeGGve environment, this thesis presents the concept that external enviromnental 
changes have an impact on the Gmdamental change in systemaGc nsk of the restaurant 
industry. GrifGn (2001) argued that the relaGonship between exogenous macroeconomic 
factors and Grm sales has never been explicitly studied, even though it was commonly 
understood that exogenous macroeconomic factors direcGy affected Grm sales. Further, 
he extended the existing Mandelker and Rhee (1984) analyGcal model of the 
determinants of systemaGc risk by examining the DEL as an explicit determinant of beta.
In addiGon to the economic impact of the 9/11 events on the restaurant industry, 
there is also a whole level of restaurant consumers' psychology or behavior that needs to 
be understood. For example, would restaurant customers continue to want to stay at home 
instead of eating out due to fears of terronsm? According to Fbocken/zce and Hosp/to/ity 
('Toodservice growth," 2001), in the weeks fbUowing the attacks, restaurant customers in 
Canada did not want to go out to dinner—perhaps because they were more safety 
conscious due to fears of terrorism or perhaps because they did not feel like celebrating 
birthdays or other special occasions. I f  the 9/11 events had a signiGcant impact on the 
restaurant industry, it may have been because restaurant customers' psychology or 
behavior could have been basically changed. I f  the restaurant customers' psychology or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
behavior changed due to the 9/11 events, and they did not want to keep eaGng out after 
9/11 due to fear of terrorism, this could have caused restaurant sales to plummet. 
Decreased sales in the restaurant industry could affect restaurant beta, which represents 
the sensidvity o f an individual stock to changes in the returns of average market. Thus, a 
change in restaurants' beta may be signiGcant due to the change in restaurant customers' 
psychology or behavior aAer the 9/11 events. This study wiU address that issue.
Development of the Restaurant Industry
The word reaiawant covers a broad range of food service operaGons. The term 
comes Gom the French word restaurant, which means "restorers of energy." The term 
was used as early as the mid-1700s to describe pubGc places that offered soup and bread. 
Today, any public place that specializes in the sale of prepared food for consumpGon on 
or oGthe premises can be described as a restaurant (Powers, 1995).
According to the NaGonal Restaurant AssociaGon (NRA, 2003), the naGon's 
restaurants achieved $407.8 bilGon in sales in 2002, an increase of almost 4 percent over 
2001. More than 54 billion meals were eaten in restaurants and school and work 
cafeterias in 2002. According to the 2003 Restaurant Industry Forecast, the naGon's 
870,000 restaurants should reach $426.1 billion in sales in 2003, which represents an 
increase of almost 4.5 percent over 2002. Thus, the growth of the restaurant industry 
during the last few years has been quite good, and the restaurant industry's beta may not 
have heen signiGcanGy affected by 9/11 events.
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Purpose of the Study
The piimary purpose of this study was to invesGgate whether the systemaGc nsk 
(|8) of the restaurant industry was affected by 9/11 events. More speciGcally, this study 
invesGgated the difference in systemaGc risk of several types of restaurant, such as 
Gne/casual dining restaurants, family restaurants, and fast food restaurants, during the 
pre- and post-9/11 periods. This study aGempts to identify the impact of the 9/11 events 
on the restaurant industry by examining the change in beta of the restaurant industry. The 
study can provide some empirical evidence on the inqiact of market change on the change 
in the restaurant business characterisGcs.
Problem Statement
Previous studies (Kim, Gu, & MattUa, 2002; Gu &  Kim, 1998; Borde, 1998) have 
examined the nsk features of the hospitality industry, such as hotel real estate investment 
trusts, casinos, and restaurants. Borde (1998) found that risk was signiGcanGy related to 
certain Gnancial characterisGcs in the restaurant industry. SpeciGcally, the Gndings 
suggest that liquidity, dividend-payout raGo, return on assets, and growth in earnings 
before interest and taxes had an inGuence on systemaGc nsk. Kim et al. (2002) found that 
beta was found to correlate posiGvely with Gnancial leverage and growth but negaGvely 
with Grm size. Those studies, however, concentrated on Grm-wise internal factors as 
determinants o f systemaGc nsk.
Other studies have found that external factors could also aGect beta. For example, 
Sankaranarayanan (1986) analyzed changes in beta related to regulatory changes. 
Sankaranarayanan developed a theoreGcal model that provided a relaGonship between the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
types of regulatory changes and the direcGons of beta change: regulaGons increased beta, 
and deregulaGons decreased beta. Further examinaGon showed that the observed changes 
in beta could not be fuUy accounted for by the changes in Gnancial and operating 
leverages o f the Grms in the aGected industry. According to Sankaranarayanan, 
regulatory changes contributed signiGcantly to the explanaGon of observed changes in 
beta.
Although many arGcles have discussed the nonstaGonary characterisGc of beta 
and variables that may be associated with beta nonstataionarity, the studies nevertheless 
did not identify the determinants of the beta change. GrifGn (2001) suggested that the 
exogenous economic disturbance, deGned as any unforeseen event that possesses the 
power to have an impact on the Grm's sales, could make a Grm's beta nonstaGonary. This 
study aGempts to identify the impact of market changes on the restaurant industry by 
empirically examining the change in systemaGc risk of the restaurant industry, if  any, in 
the wake of the 9/11 terronst attacks. SpeciGcally, this study compares the beta far 
several types of restaurant in the periods before and after the events of 9/11 to determine 
whether characterisGcs of each restaurant segment changed as a result of the 9/11 events. 
The fbUowing four research quesGons were invesGgated in this study:
1) Did the entire restaurant industry's systemaGc risk change signiGcantly after 
the events of 9/11? ;
2) Did the Gne/casual dining restaurant's systemaGc risk change signiGcanGy 
aAer the 9/11 events? ;
3) Did the fanuly restaurant's systemaGc risk change signiGcantly aAer the 9/11 
events? ; and.
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4) Did the fast-fbod restaurant's systematic risk change signiGcantly aAer the 
9/11 events?
Research Hypotheses 
In this secGon, imphcit hypotheses are described. The rejecGon of the null 
hypothesis (H ,) would imply that there is a staGsGcally signiGcant difference in pre-9/11 
and post 9/11 systemaGc risks, which may signal the underlying change of the restaurant 
business characterisGcs. The test hypothesis is thus formulated and presented in Table 1.
Soon aAer the events of 9/11, Technomic, Inc., a Chicago-based food service 
consulting company, released new, reduced-growth estimates at the IntemaGonal 
Foodservice Manufacturers AssociaGons' (IFM A) annual Forecast and OuGook seminars, 
reGecGng the impact of the 9/11 events and the general economic slowdown in the U.S. 
fbodservice industry ("Foodservice Growth Forecasts Reduced," 2001). Technomic 
fbrecasted that consumers would continue to eat out, but would likely trade down in their 
dining choices. As a result, limited-service restaurants such as fast-fbod restaurants 
would face a slight boost, with 2002 sales growth projected to range Gom Gat to 
approximately 3.5 percent. However, they projected that sales growth fbr the fuU-service 
and upscale segment, such as Gne/casual dining restaurants, could be between -3  percent 
and 3 percent. According to a U.S-based NPD Group Inc. report, a higher-than-average 
number of Americans were choosing to order take-out fast fbod in the wake of the 9/11 
attacks ("Fast Food Favoured," 2001). NPD also repoAed that full-service restaurant 
sales, including upscale restaurants and mid-scale restaurants, dropped 1.2 percent each 
year in the United States. Since the 9/11 events may have aGected each restaurant
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segment differently, three snb-hypotheses were tested to see if  the systemaGc nsk of each 
restaurant segment changed signiGcanGy due to the events of 9/11 :
Table 1
The Test Hypothesis and Three Sub-hvootheses fbr this Studv
Type of Restaurant Hypothesis
Entire Restaurant 
Industry
Ho: The post-9/11 beta of the restaurant industry was not 
signiGcantly different Gom its pre-9/11 beta.
Hg: The post-9/11 beta of the restaurant industry was 
signiGcanGy different Gom its pre-9/11 beta.
Hoi : The post-9/11 beta of the Gne/casual dining restaurant was 
not signiGcanGy different Gom its pnor-9/11 beta.
Fine/casual dining
Restaurant H,! : The post-9/11 beta of the Gne/casual dining restaurant was
signiGcanGy different Gom its pnor-9/11 beta.
Ho2 : The post-9/11 beta of the family restaurant was not 
signiGcanGy different Gom its pnor-9/11 beta.
Ha2 : The post-9/11 beta of the family restaurant was signiGcanGy 
diGerent Gom its prior-9/11 beta.
Family Restaurant
Fast-fbod Restaurant
Ho]: The post-9/11 beta of the fast-fbod restaurant was not 
signiGcanGy different Gom its prior-9/11 beta.
Ha3 : The post-9/11 beta of the fast-fbod restaurant was 
signiGcanGy different Gom its pnor-9/11 beta.
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LimitaGons of the Study
This study has the fbllowing limitaGons:
1) The sample used in this study is limited to the restaurants whose com m on stocks 
were publicly traded on the security market and whose financial data are available 
on the Internet Website of http://www.Gnance.yahoo.com; and,
2) Due to the small number of Gne dining restaurant Grms, they have to be combined 
with casual dining restaurant Grms.
3) Numerous empirical studies have used the 60-month stock prices to estimate beta. 
According to Femàndez (2002), historical betas depend on the data used (daily, 
weekly, months, etc.), in almost all companies. This study only employs weekly 
stock prices in the pre- and post-9/11 period over 52 weeks.
SigniGcance of the Study 
First, this study conGrms whether the 9/11 events signiGcantly changed the 
systemaGc risk of restaurant Grms, thus providing some empirical evidence on the impact 
of market change on the change in the restaurant business characterisGcs. Second, this 
study helps restaurant investors beGer assess the nature of risk in the restaurant industry 
in the post-9/11 time, thus assisting them in making informed investment decisions 
according to their risk tolerance.
Third, the Gndings should provide useful infbrmaGon fnr restaurant execuGves 
regarding their Gnancing decisions in the post-9/11 era. According to Ramchand and 
Sethapakdi (2000), stock price volaGlity is driven by systemaGc as well as unsystemaGc 
nsk. Ramchand and Sethapakdi suggested that changes in risk were important not only
10
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fbr theoreGcal reasons but also fbr the cost of co ital of a Grm, because they affect the 
required rate of return on equity. The cost of capital of the Grm is of concern to restaurant 
entrepreneurs. A beGer understanding of the possibility that risk feature can be changed 
in the restaurant industry in the wake of the 9/11 events should help industry execuGves 
ac^ ust their Gnancing strategy, if  needed, such as with debt leverage.
OrganizaGon of the Study 
Chapter 1 presents the study's objecGves, problem statement, research quesGons, 
hypotheses, hmitaGons, signiGcance, and deGniGons of terms. Chuter 2 reviews the 
hterature on the basic CAPM model and the change in systemaGc nsk. Chapter 3 presents 
a discussion of restaurant categories, data coUecGon procedures, the time Game of the 
study, the characterisGc line and beta, the estimaGon of beta, the cumulaGve abnormal 
return, and the staGsGcal methods used in this study. Chapter 4 repoAs the empirical 
results and analyzes the results. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the study by summarizing 
its Gndings, discussing its implicaGons, and providing recormnendaGons G)r future 
research.
DeGniGon of Important Terms
1. Restaurant industry. A  group of Grms that cover a broad range of fbod service 
operaGons. The term comes Gom the French word reamwrnnr, meaning 
"restorers of energy." Any public place that specializes in the sale of prepared 
fbod fbr consumpGon on or off premises can be described as a restaurant 
(Powers, 1995).
11
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2. Fine/casual dining restaurant. Most full-service establishments are small, 
independent operaGons, some seaGng fewer than 100 guests (Powers, 1995). 
The average per-person check at the typical Gne dining restaurant is $25 or 
more (Ebbin, 2000). Casual dining offers popular Gxxls in a setting that is 
more appealing than most midscale restaurants and more of a value than Gne 
dining (John & Wayne, 1994). The average sale per guest in a typical casual 
dining restaurant ranges Gom $15 to 24.99 (Ebbin, 2000).
3. Family restaurant. Family restaurants usually oGer breakfast, lunch, and 
dinner. The average check per-person in a typical family restaurant is less than 
$15 (Ebbin, 2000).
4. Fast-fbod restaurant. Parsa and Kahn (1992, p. 19) deGne a fast-fbod restaurant 
as a "Grm with a mission to provide quicker service and core technology 
geared towards this mission and commonly more attracGve fbr the customers 
that demand convenience, speed, and simplicity of service at an affbrdable 
price." According to the NRA's Restaurant Industry OperaGon RepoA 2000, 
the average daily seat turnover o f fast fbod restaurants is the highest 
among the restaurant categones (Ebbin, 2000).
5. SystemaGc nsk. The term fystemahc rü t is to be interpreted as the porGon of 
the vaiiaGon (or total nsk) in return on a security or portfblio that can be 
eliminated by diversiGcaGon (Levy and Samat, 1984). It is deGned as the nsk 
that results Gom factors that aGect the stocks of all companies. It is the paA of 
a security's total risk that cannot be eliminated through an investor's 
diversiGcaGon.
12
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6. Unsystematic risk. It is deGned as the nsk that results Gom factors that are 
unique to a parGcular Grm. It is the part of a security's total risk that can be 
eliminated by an investor's diversiGcaGon.
7. Beta. The term W a is deGned as a measure of the systemaGc risk of a Grm's 
common stock. It measures the sensiGvity of the Gnancial asset's return to the 
change in return on the overall market portfblio.
8. CharacterisGc line. A regression Gne that shows a Gnear relaGonship between 
the rate of return of a security or portfbGo and the corresponding rates of 
return of the overall market portfbGo. The slope of this Gne is used as the 
estimated beta G)r the security or portfbGo.
9. Capital Asset Pricing Model fCAPM). The term CqpGn/ /fsset fncm g AfbdeZ 
(CAPM) is deGned as the model that proposes that any stock's requGed rate of 
return is equal to the risk-Gee rate of return plus a risk premium, where nsk 
reGects diversiGcaGon (Bngham, 1992).
13
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW  
IntmducGon
In order to provide a better understanding o f how a change in systemaGc nsk may 
result Gom major market events, such as the 9/11 events, this chapter reviews previous 
studies examining the fundamental determinants of systemaGc risk and the factors that 
may cause changes in systemaGc risk.
Basic C oital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
One of the pillars in the theory of Gnance is the CAPM that grew out of the 
seminal work by Markowitz on the mean-vaiiance hypothesis (Markowitz, 1952). CAPM 
was later formally developed by Sharpe (1963; 1964) and Lintner (1965). According to 
Lintner (1965) and Sharpe (1963; 1964), the CAPM theory describes a relaGonship 
between the expected return on a security and its systemaGc risk measured by the beta 
coefBcient. In CAPM, the equilibrium return on an asset f is symbolized as foGows:
e {r; ) = r,+ P , ( e {r, ] - r, )  (2.1)
where:
R, is the return to holders o f equity securiGes of Grm i;
R, is the risk Gee rate of interest available to all individuals and Grms;
14
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is the expected rate of return on the market poAfblio; and, 
is deGned as the systemaGc nsk of security i.
The basic CAPM equaGon above can also be expressed as:
J = a, + ), where
A  “ d a, = « ,( l-A ) -
Also, ) = Ry 4- ACov(R, ,R ,), where
....
The CAPM theory (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1963,1964) proposes that the expected 
return on a nsky asset is composed of the nsk-Goe rate plus the risk premium, where the 
nsk premium is the excess market return over the risk-Gee rate mulGplied by the level of 
systemaGc nsk G>r the speciGc investment. The beta is denoted by the symbol and is 
deGned as an index of systemaGc risk. In CAPM, beta is the only security-speciGc 
parameter that affects the expected return on a security because of two diversiGed 
portG)lio assumpGons. The model suggests that if  markets are in equihbnum, the 
expected rate of return on a security is the sum o f the risk-Gee rate and the nsk premium, 
where the nsk prenGum is the product of the market pnce of nsk and a security's 
systemaGc nsk (Haugen, 1995).
According to Haugen (1995), the CAPM model assumes that two types of events 
have impact on the volaGlity in a stock's rate of return. The Grst type of event is called a 
/Mrcroevent, which affects an individual Grm. Microevents do not inGuence other Grms.
In other words, they have no effect on the value o f the market portfblio or its rate of
15
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return. However, they do aSect the rate of return on the individual stock. The 
developments of new products, the changes in accounting techniques in a particular hrm, 
employee strikes, or the resignation or death of a key person in a firm are examples of 
microevents.
Other types of events are macroevents. Unlike microevents, macroevents have an 
impact on all firms' stock prices and the rates of return on individual securities. An 
unexpected change in the rate of inflation, an unexpected change in the Federal Reserve 
discount rate, a change in the term structure o f interest rates, or the 9/11 events is 
examples o f macroevents.
The Change in Systematic Risk
Another area of studies involving CAPM investigates forces that cause a Grm's 
beta, or an industry's beta to change. OfBcer (1973) examined changes in the variability 
of the market factor of the NYSE and concluded that the changes in macroeconomic 
indicators have some efkct on beta. Turnbull (1977) offered a theoretical model, 
implying that the systematic risk of a 6rm can be determined by the changes in the Arm's 
speciGc components and economic variables. Robichek and Cohn (1974) indicated that 
beta coefGcients are generally affected by macroeconomic variables.
Hamada (1972) adopted CAPM to depict the relationship among operating 
leverage, jSnancial leverage, the variance o f sales or earnings, and the market beta. 
Hamada demonstrated that the systematic risk of the levered Arm consists of two parts: a 
Anancial leverage component and an operating risk component. Rubenstein (1973) 
extended Hamada's work, and was the Arst researcher to demonstrate that the systemaAc
16
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risk of the levered Arm could be written as a AmcAon of operating nsk. Rubenstein, while 
holding pnce and variable cost constant and allowing quanAty sold to be stochasAc, 
stated that the levered Arm's beta ) is a AmcAon of operating nsk, the variance of
sales per dollar of assets, and a term that reAected the inAuence of economy-wide events. 
ThereA)re, Rubenstein was the Arst researcher to exphciAy demonsAate the fact that 
exogenous economic events play a part in explaining systemaAc nsk, using the foAowing 
expression:
- r j p C & J . i r a r Q. ''
£1= 1
-------
Where the terms are as follows:
«g = the proporAon of the Arm's total assets devoted to acAvity a;
6^  ^= the total equity value of the unlevered Arm;
T = the corporate tax rate;
= the number of product lines the Arm supports;
= pnce per unit of output in acAvity a;
= vanable cost per unit of output in acAvity a; 
f], = Axed costs in acAvity a;
= the contribuAon margin, which Rubenstein suggested reAects the operating
nsk;
p(gg reAects the inAuence of economy-wide events on acAvity a; and.
17
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Far  ^ ^ the uncertainty of sales of per doUar o f assets devoted to a.
Lev and Kunitzky (1974) recognized that there might exist industry-wide, 
exogenous, and uncertain variables that affect all firms in the marketplace. They 
examined the negative relationship between earnings voladhty and stock price. Their 
research showed that if  jGrm management had the intuiAon to anAcipate the arrival of 
these random economic shocks, management could install internal smoothing 
mechanisms designed to either reduce or eliminate the negaAve impact of these shocks on 
the Arm's income, thus minimizing or eliminating the variance of the Arm's earnings.
Cornne (1982) extended the Rubenstein (1973) work by developing a theoreAcal 
relaAonship between systemaAc risk and business nsk. Conine demonstrated that not only 
is the Arm's quanAty of output a random variable, subject to macroeconomic factors 
exogenous to the Arm, but also that both pnce and vanable costs may be random 
vanables, subject to those same exogenous macroeconomic forces. Conine demonstrated 
that the systemaAc nsk of the unlevered Arm is a AmcAon of price, vanable costs, 
quanAty sales, market return, the uncertainty of both quanAty sales, the contribuAon 
margin, and the inAuence of economy-wide events on an acAvity. Therefore, Conine 
demonstrated the reacAon of the overaA marketplace to an exogenous economic 
perturbaAon.
More recenAy, GrifAn (2001) examined the degree of economic leverage (DEL) 
as an explicit determinant of systemaAc risk and assessed the incremental explanatory 
power of the DEL through empirical testing. The DEL is deAned as the percentage 
change in the Arm's sales that results Aom a unit percentage change attributable to an
18
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exogenous economic disturbance. GrifAn also indicated an economic disturbance as any 
unforeseen event that possesses the power to disturb the equilibrium of the model and 
equilibrium of Arm operaAons. The exogenous economic disturbance used here is the 
tragic events that had a disastrous impact on Arm sales. Because the Arm's returns are 
generated by Arm sales, and the variance in sales is attributed to AuctuaAons in the 
economy resulting Aom uncertainAes in the economic, poAAcal, social, and compeAtive 
environment, an exogenous economic disturbance may be the explanaAon of the change 
in systemaAc nsk.
Literature Review Summary 
The objecAve of this literature review is to represent a histoncal roadmap o f the 
relevant Anancial research of the efkrts expended trying to beAer explain the change in 
systemaAc nsk depending on an external environment. In this thesis, systemaAc risk is 
considered as the variable beta contained within the CAPM, expression (2.1). This 
chuter reviews histoncal studies examining the fundamental determinants of systemaAc 
risk and factors that may cause changes in systemaAc risk.
Sharpe (1963,1964) and Linter (1965) developed the CAPM theory, which 
descnbes a relaAonship between the expected return on a secunty and its systemaAc nsk 
measured by the beta coefGcient. In other words, in CAPM the expected return on a 
security could be expressed as a AmcAon of the nsk-Aee rate, the difference between the 
market return and the nsk-Aee rate, and a systemaAc nsk factor caAed beta.
Haugen (1995) explained that the CAPM model assumed that two types of events 
affected the volaAlity in a stock's rate of return: microevents and macroevents.
19
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Microevents have no effect on the value of the market portfolio or its rate o f return. 
However, unlike microevents, macroevents have an impact on all firms' stock prices and 
the rates o f return on individual securiAes.
Another aspect of CAPM studies involved the change in systemaAc nsk. Hamada 
(1972) was the first researcher to decompose the systemaAc nsk of the levered company 
in order to express beta as a fimcAon of operating nsk and Anancial nsk. Building on 
Hamada's work, Rubenstein (1973) was the Arst researcher to explicitly demonsAate the 
fact that exogenous economic events play a part in explaining systemaAc risk. Rubenstein 
stated that the levered Arm's beta is a funcAon of operating nsk, the variance of sales per 
doUar of assets, and economy-wide events.
Lev and Kunitzky (1974) perceived that industry-wide, exogenous, and uncertain 
variables that affect all Arms in the marketplace might exist. Lev and Kunitzky 
demonstrated the negaAve relaAonship between earnings volatility and stock pnce. 
Furthermore, Lev and Kunitzky proposed that a Arm could either reduce or eliminate the 
affects of these shocks by using internal smoothing mechanisms, if  the Arm had an ability 
to foresee the economic shocks.
Conine (1982) expanded Rubenstein's (1973) work by developing a theoreAcal 
relaAonship between systemaAc risk and business risk. Conine demonstrated the reacAon 
of the overall marketplace to an exogenous economic disturbance.
GrifAn (2001) examined the DEL as an explicit determinant of systemaAc nsk 
and assessed the incremental explanatory power o f the DEL through empirical testing. 
GrifAn also indicated an economic disturbance as any un&reseen event that possesses the 
power to disturb the equilibnum o f the model and equihbnum of Arm operaAons. GrifGn
20
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recognized that the exogenous economic disturbance might be the explanaAon of the 
change in systemaAc nsk.
In order to provide a beAer understanding of how a change in systemaAc nsk may 
result Aom major market events such as the 9/11 events, this chuter reviews previous 
studies examining the fundamental determinants of systemaAc nsk and factors that may 
cause changes in systemaAc nsk.
21
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CHAPTERS
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
InAoducAon
This chapter speciAes the data and the research methodology used to accompAsh 
the objecAves of this study. First, a restaurant classiAcaAon is presented in which three 
different types of restaurants are categorized. Second, the data collecAon procedure is 
explained. Third, the Ame Aame employed A)r the study is discussed. Fourth, the 
characterisAc line (CL) and beta are descnbed. Fifth, the procedure used to estimate beta 
or systemaAc nsk of a Arm's common stock is explained. Sixth, CumulaAve Abnormal 
Return (CAR), which was employed to detect the pattern of restaurant stock returns aAer 
the 9/11 events, is discussed. Finally, the hypotheses regarding beta changes are tested.
Restaurant ClassiAcaAon/Categones 
According to the NaAonal Restaurant AssociaAon (NRA), the restaurant industry 
is deAned as an industry including aü meals and snacks prepared outside the home. The 
deAniAon of the restaurant industry also includes aU takeout meals and beverages. The 
NRA classiAes all eating establishments into three categones. The major restaurant 
grouping used by the NRA in its analysis of the industry is as fallows (Lundberg, 1994):
1. Commercial Restaurant Services (Group 1): This group consists of
establishments that are open to the public, are operated for proAt, and may
22
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operate facîAAes and/or supply meal service regularly for others. Commercial 
restaurant service accounts for 91 percent of industry sales.
2. Noncommercial Restaurant Services (Group 2): This group comprises the 
business, educaAonal, insAtuAonal, and governmental and noncommercial 
organizations that operate their own restaurant services. As compared to 
commercial food service, institutional fbodservice does not aim to make money; 
it simply strives to provide a service. Although some establishments operate at a 
proAt, this is not the aim of the restaurant-service acAvity. Rather, they serve food 
principally for their own employees, students, paAents, and so on.
3. M ilitary Restaurant Services (Group 3): M ilitary fbodservice is the smallest 
segment. This group compnses the sales of food and beverages at ofAcers' and 
enlisted personnel clubs and military bases.
The commercial restaurant segment includes the Ane dining restaurant, casual 
dining restaurant, family restaurant, and fast-fbod restaurant segments as deAned by 
average check and other charactensAcs. The NRA (2000) descnbed a full-service 
restaurant as an establishment that provides servers, and patrons pay aAer they eat. In 
contrast, at a fast-fbod restaurant there is usually no table service, and patrons generally 
order at a cash resister or dnve-tbru window, or they select items Aom a fbod bar and pay 
befbre they eat.
Fine and Casual Dining Restaurants 
Fine dining restaurants concentrate on providing services of high standards and 
establishing a reputaAon that draws customers back Ame and Ame again. Most Ane dining 
establishments are smaU, independent operaAons, some seating fewer than 100 guests
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(Powers, 1995). The chef and staff are highly trained and are weU known for giving 
personalized service. According to Ware and Rndinick (1991), this type of restaurant 
requires lower employee turnover because of the high guest-check average. According to 
the NRA Restaurant Industry Operation Report 2000, the average per-person check at the 
typical Ane dining restaurant is $25 or more (Ebbin, 2000).
Casual dining restaurants provide a varied menu and table service, with prices 
ranging Aom mid to upscale. Most casual restaurants have a unifying theme that pervades 
the design of the menu, interior décor, and oAen the exterior of the building (Powers, 
1995). The ambience is intended to support a dining experience that is fun and relaxing. 
In order to achieve this theme, casual dining restaurants may use an ethnic theme in both 
décor and fbod service, depicting an event or adventure in a faraway place. In the 
midscale price range, chains predominate with operaAons such as TGI Fnday's, Chili's, 
Applebee's, Bennigan's, Red Lobster, and Olive Garden (Kochak, 2000; Powers, 1995). 
According to the NRA Restaurant Industry OperaAon Report 2000, the sales per guest in 
a typical casual dining restaurant average Aom $15 to $24.99 (Ebbin, 2000).
Familv Restaurants
Family restaurants, such as Denny's, Shoney's, and Big Boy, are table service 
restaurants but compete principally with fast-fbod operaAons and have more in common 
with these lower pnced operaAon than with upscale units (Powers, 1995). Family 
restaurants usuaAy offer breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Most meals consist of a choice of 
soup or salad, an enAée with roAs and buAer, and perhaps a dessert. This reducAon in 
courses simpliAes service compared to Ane/casual dining restaurants. Platters, 
sandwiches, and salads are the mainstay of the menu, all attracAvely but simply served.
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Many family restaurants oBer budget menus or special selections for seniors. To appeal 
to all these market segments, family restaurants are offering expanded menus featuring 
selecAons that are lighter and healthier (Powers, 1995). According to the NRA's 
Restaurant Industry OperaAon Report 2000, the average check per person in a typical 
farruly restaurant is less than $15 (Ebbin, 2000).
Fast-Food Restaurants 
Fast-fbod restaurants are those that seA quickly prepared fbods. This kind of 
restaurant is oAen a Aanchise operaAon. The limited menu is generally low pnced; the 
fbod is mainly take-out in disposable containers. The stafGng requirements are minimal, 
and staffs need not be highly trained (Ware & Rudnick, 1991). The key to the success of 
fast fbod is its simpAcity; fbr instance, its limited menu. Each item on the menu has been 
engineered to simpAfy and standardize its purchase, producAon, and service. 
SimpAAcaAon of the producAon process permits the use of unskiAed labor (Powers,
1995). AutomaAon is also cnAcal to the modem fast-fbod restaurant. The automating 
concept means a reducAon in menu choices, sharp AmitaAons on customer service, and 
different customer behavior. Through self-service, the customer replaces the entire Aont- 
of-the-house staff) even to the point of cleaning up. Moreover, because fast-fbod 
operaAons offer a simple menu, very specialized and h i^ y  efAcient kitchens can be built 
around this Amited menu (Powers, 1995). According to the NRA's Restaurant Industry 
OperaAon Report 2000, the average daily seat turnover of fast-fbod restaurants is the 
highest among the restaurant categories (Ebbin, 2000).
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Data CollecAon
This study attempted to identity beta diBerences, if  any, of restaurant Arms in the 
pre-and post-9/11 penods. The restaurant stock data used in this study were taken Aom 
Histoncal Stock Quotes at http://www.Anance.yahoo.com. The sample Air each type of 
restaurant in this study compnsed all public restaurant companies whose shares were 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), 
or NaAonal AssociaAon of SecuriAes Dealers Automated QuotaAons (NASDAQ) during 
the 52 weeks pnor to and the 52 weeks aAer the 9/11 events. The weekly stock returns Air 
each restaurant, deAned as the percentage changes of Arms' stock pnces ar^ usted Air 
dividends and stock splits, and the weekly stock return on market portAilio, were 
coUected Air estimating the beta of the categorized restaurant industry segment. The 
weekly return on market portAiAo was represented by the changes in the Standard &  
Poor's (S&P) 500 index, because the S&P 500 index is one of the best indicators of 
overall market direcAon. Many previous studies have used S&P 500 index to represent 
overall market behavior. Restaurant Arms that did not have 52-week data beAire 9/11 or 
aAer 9/11 were not included in the sample Air this study. Seventy-three restaurant 
companies with complete stock price data between the period of 52 weeks beAire 9/11 
and 52 weeks aAer 9/11 were selected as the iniAal sample Air the study. Six companies 
that were traded in the over-the-counter bulletin board were removed Aom the total 
sample Air this study. Thus, a total o f Sixty-seven Arms were included in the Anal 
sample. Twenty-three companies were in the fast-Aiod restaurant industry, sixteen Arms 
were in the family restaurant industry, and twenty-eight were gathered Aom the 
Ane/casual dining restaurant industry. The sample of Arms is listed in Table 2.
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Table 2
Samnle Firms Selected fbr This Study
Type o f Restaurant Company Stock Symbol
Casual/Fine dining 
Restaurants 
(28)
1. Applebee's, In t'l, Inc. APPB
2. Cheesecake Factory, Inc. CAKE
3. Benihana, Inc. BNHN
4. Brioker IntemaAonal, Inc. EAT
5. BUCA, Inc. BUCA
6 Champions Sports, Inc. CMPP
7. Chicago Pizza & Brewery CHGO
8. Darden Restaurants, Inc. DRI
9. Dave & Buster's, Inc. DAB
10. Granite City Food & Brewery, Ltd. GCFBU
11. G rill Concepts, Inc. GRIL
12. Landry's Seafbod Restaurants, Inc. LNY
13. Lone Star Steakhouse Saloon STAR
14. Main St. & Main, Inc. M AIN
15. Mexican Restaurants CASA
16. O'Charley's, Inc. CHUX
17. Outback Steakhouse OSI
18. RARE Hospitality RARE
19. Rubio's Restaurants, Inc. RUBO
20. Ruby Tuesday's, Inc. R I
21. Sizzler IntemaAonal sz
22. Star BuBet, Inc. STRZ
23. Total Entertainment TENT
24. Tumbleweed, Inc. TWED
25. Flannigan's Enterprises Inc BDL
26. P.F. Changs's China Bistro, Inc. PFCB
27. J.Alexanders's Corp JAX
28. Atk Restaurant ARKR
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Table 2 (Continued)
Samnle Firms Selected fbr This Study
Type o f Restaurant Company Stock Symbol
29. mOP Corp. m p
30. Steak and Shake Co. SNS
31. Ryan's Family Steak Houses RYAN
32. Bob Evans Farms, Inc. BOBE
33. Cahfbmia Beach Restaurants, Inc. CPKI
34. CBRL Group, Inc. CBRL
Family Restaurants
35. CEC Entertainment, Inc. CEC
36. Eateries, Inc. EATS
(15) 37. Elmer's Restaurants, Inc. ELMS
38. Famous Dave's of America DAVE
39. Fresh Choice, Inc. SALD
40. Garden Fresh Restaurants LTUS
41. Luby's Cafeterias LUB
42. Max &  Erma's Restaurants, Inc. MAKE
43. Piccadilly Cafeteria, Inc. PIC
44. Friendly Ice Corporation FRN
45. Jack in the Box JBX
46. McDonalds MCD
47. Wendy's WEN
48. Schlotzsky's, Inc BUNZ
49. CKE Restaurants CKR
Fast-Food Restaurants 50. Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc CHKR
(23)
51. Yum! Brands, Inc YUM
52. Autogrill SpA AGL
53. Back Yard Burger, Inc BYBI
54. Diedrich CoBee Co. DDRX
55. Frisch's Restaurants FRS
56. Good Times Restaurants, Inc. GTIM
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Samnle Firms Selected fbr This Study
Type o f Restaurant Company Stock Symbol
57. Knspy Kreme KKD
58. MerAage Hospitality Group Inc MHG
59. Morgans, Food MR
60. Nathan's Famous, Inc. NATH
61. Panera Bread Co. PNRA
Fast-Food Restaurants 62. P ^a John's IntemaAonal, Inc. PZZA
(23) 63. Pizza Am, Inc. PZZI
64. Quahty Dining, Inc. QDIN
65. Sonic Corp. SONC
66. Starbucks CorporaAon SBUX
67. Tnarc Companies, Inc. TRY
JVb/e. Number in parenthesis indicates number of Arms in this segment included in the sample fbr 
this study.
Time Frame of the Study 
In order to test the change in systemaAc nsk after the events of 9/11, the time 
Aame of this study was divided into two diBerent penods: the 52 weeks befbre the 9/11 
events and the 52 weeks aAer the 9/11 events. This short period was chosen because a 
longer post-9/11 penod would include addiAonal post-9/11 events, such as the war in Iraq 
and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic. Those events may also 
have had an impact on the restaurant stock pnce and beta, thus making the impact of 9/11 
events on restaurant beta hard to determine.
29
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Characteristic Line (CL) and Beta
The relationship between the rate of return on a security i (denoted by R, ) and the
rate of return on a market portfolio (denoted by ) is explained by the characteristic line
(Brigham, 1992; Haugen, 1995; Moses & Cheney, 1989; Radclifle, 1994; Van Home,
1989). The characteristic line describes the return that the stock can be expected to 
produce, as compared to the market's rate of return. It is also described by the line ofbest 
At that minimizes the sum of the squared verAcal distances Aom the line fbr each of the 
ordered pairs of the return on a firm's security and the return on a market portAilio 
(Bodie, Kane, &  Marcus, 1989; Haugen, 1995; Moses & Cheney, 1989).
The charactensAc line can be described by its slope and the point at which it 
passes through the verAcal axis (its y-intercept). The slope of the charactensAc line is 
commonly referred to as the stock's beta and is denoted by the symbol )3. The slope or 
beta indicates the degree to which the stock responds to changes in the return produced 
by the overall market.
A value-weighted market portfblio, such as the Standard & Poors (S&P) 500 
index, the NYSE index, or the NASDAQ composite index, is commonly used as the 
market portfblio index (RadcliBe, 1994; Reilly, 1994). These market portfbhos contain a 
representaAve sample of all stocks, with each industry weighted in accordance with the 
overall market.
Researchers (Haugen, 1995; Levy & Samat, 1984; Van Home, 1989) have 
explained the concept of a charactensAc line by suggesting the possibility o f classifying 
Arms by their nsks. For example, if  stocks have a beta greater than one (j3> 1), they are 
classiAed as aggressive (risky) stocks, because they go up faster than the market in a bull
30
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
market (rising market) but fall faster in a bear market (falling market). However, if  stocks 
have a beta less than one ()3 < 1), they are classiAed as defensive (low-risky) stocks, 
because their returns Auctuate less than the market as a whole. Finally, if  stocks have a 
beta equal to one, they are classiAed as the neutral (as risky as the market) stocks, 
because they Auctuate along with the market. According to Levy and Samat (1984), the 
pnce of "an ideal stock or portfblio" goes up faster than the market portfbho in a bull 
market and goes down more slowly than the market portfblio in a bear market. Levy and 
Samat (1984) also recommended the portfbho of an ideal stock, which combines the 
desirable properties ofboth a defensive, and an aggressive stock.
EstimaAon of Beta
The fbllowing simple regression equaAon is fbrmulated using weekly restaurant 
stock retum and weekly equal-weighted retum on market portfbho, represented by 
weekly S&P 500 index change, to estimate the beta of each restaurant, where beta is a 
measure of the systemaAc nsk of a Arm's stock:
+ (3.1)
Where:
R, = weekly restaurant stock retum;
R ,= weekly market portfbho retum; 
a = constant;
= estimated beta; and, 
g = the error about the regression hne.
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Based on this regression eqnaAon, the beta fbr each restaurant industry segment 
was estimated. The slope of the characterisAc line is commonly referred to as the stock's 
beta and is denoted by the symbol The slope or the estimated beta indicates the degree 
to which the stock responds to changes in the retum produced by the overall market.
Abnormal Retum (AR) and CumulaAve Abnormal Retum (CAR)
The CAR method was introduced by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969). In the 
CAR method, the analysis penod is divided into an esAmaAon penod (a pre-event penod) 
and a post-event penod. DesignaAon of the locaAon and length of either penod is 
arbitrary. This study examined 104 weeks around the 9/11 events. This study designated 
-52, -51, -5 0 ,..., -3, -2, -1 as the 52 weeks pnor to the 9/11 events, 0 as the 9/11 event 
week, and +1, +2, + 3 ,..., 4-50, +51, +52 as the 52 weeks after the 9/11 events. Then, fbr 
each of the Arms in the sample, the rate of retum on each of the 104 weeks is computed.
The pre-event penod observaAons were used to estimate the market model 
parameters, such as and in expression (3.2), fbr the pre-event and the post-event 
penod. AAer estimating the market model parameters, AR was calculated fbr each of the 
104 weeks fbr each Arm in the sample. AR ( g, ) Air a Arm on week t is presented as 
fbllowing:
-  ((^ 1 + (3.2)
Where:
g, = abnormal retum on week t;
= the actual stock retum on week t;
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((Z, + , ) = the expected stock retum on week t;
 ^= the market retum on week t;
O] = estimated market model constant Aom the pre-event period 
observaAons; and,
= estimated market model beta Aom the pre-event penod 
observaAons.
Expression (3.2) depicts that AR ( f , ) is considered as the market model 
predicAon error during the analysis penod. An implicit assumpAon is that the market 
model parameters ( a, and A  ) not aBected by the Aical event during the post-event 
penod. ThereAire, the market model predicAon error (AR), which is signiGcantly 
diBerent Aom zero during the post-event period, is attributed to the event To measure the 
eBects of the 9/11 events on sample securiAes, the average abnormal retum on week t is 
obtained by averaging across the Arms in the sample and is summed to yield a CAR, 
which stands Air the cumulaAve abnormal retum attained by each Arm on each of the 
Ame intervals previously selected. The /-test is used to identic whether the estimated 
CAR of the post-9/11 period are signiAcantly diBerent Aom zero. The CAR 5 represents 
the CAR Air week +5 in the post-9/11 penod. The CAR 52 is the CAR Air the 52™^ week 
in the post-9/11 penod. CAR (-52, -i) stands Air the CARs obtained during the pre-event 
penod; CAR (-52, -20) is the sum of the weekly average abnormal returns Air weeks -52 to 
-20 during the pre-event penod; CAR (+i. +30) is the sum of the weekly average abnormal 
returns Air weeks 1 to 30 during the post-event period, and Anally CAR (+i, +52) stands Air 
those obtained Air the post-event penod. Since the market model is estimated by
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employing the pre-event period observations, CAR (-5 2 , -i), which means the total sum of 
the market model predicAon errors in the pre-event penod, is zero.
In this study, in order to see if  the beta charactensAc of the restaurant industry 
was changed after the 9/11 events, the analysis of the CAR pattern is concentrated on the 
post-9/11 penod. For example, if  the CAR of the post-9/11 period consistently nses or 
drops, then the CAR pattern of the post-9/11 penod may be an indicaAon that the beta has 
changed due to the 9/11 events.
The posiAve abnormal retum is interpreted as resulting Aom a favorable event, 
which increases the proAtability of the affected secunAes. It is possible that the posiAve 
abnormal retum is affected by the increase in the nsk factor when the market index rises 
(bull market), and vice versa. I f  the market index keeps nsing, and the systemaAc pattem 
of a security' CAR drops gradually or becomes negaAve fbr the post-event penod, it is 
possible that the market nsk (beta) is decreased (Lee, 1996). On the other hand, when the 
market index keeps declining, the decrease in the market risk or beta can be a factor fbr 
the posiAve CAR fbr the post-event penod. Therefbre, the systemaAc pattem of a 
security's CAR can show the change in systemaAc nsk. In order to invesAgate the change 
in beta, the CAR of entire restaurant industry and each restaurant segment is used fbr this 
study.
The Paired Sample TTest and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test fbr Testing the Hypotheses 
The primary goal of this study was to invesAgate the change in systemaAc nsk in 
the restaurant industry aAer 9/11. The Paired Samples / test was employed to determine 
whether the post-9/11 beta of the restaurant industry was signiAcantly different Aom its
34
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
pre-9/11 beta. I f  the estimated post-9/11 beta of the restaurant industry was statisAcally 
significant Aom the estimated pre-9/11 beta of the restaurant industry, it would be 
interpreted as evidence of the impact of the 9/11 events on the restaurant industry's 
systemaAc nsk. If  the estimated post-9/11 beta of the restaurant industry was not 
staAsAcally signiAcant Aom the estimated pre-9/11 beta of the restaurant industry, it 
would be regarded as evidence of nonexistence of the impact of the 9/11 events on the 
restaurant industry's systemaAc nsk. The paired sample / test was also used to idenAfy 
whether the post-9/11 beta of the Ane/casual dining, family, and fast-fbod restaurants was 
sigruAcanAy different Aom its pre-9/11 counterpart. Because of the probabihty of the 
normormal distnbuAon of the estimated betas of sample restaurants, the Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks Test, a nonparametric subsAtute fbr the parametric r test, was also conducted to 
examine the change in systemaAc nsk over the pre- and post-9/11 penods, not only in the 
entire restaurant industry, but also in each categonzed restaurant segment.
The staAsAcal computer program, StaAsAcal Package fbr the Social Sciences 
(SPSS 11.5), was used fbr data analysis. The paired samples / test and the Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks Test were conducted at the .05 level to test the null hypotheses (Ho, Hoi, 
Ho2 , and H0 3). The usual signiAcance level of .05 was employed far this study. If  the 
observed value of the test staAsAc feU in the rejecAon region, the null hypothesis was 
rejected, or the altemaAve hypothesis was accepted. For example, if  the observed z-value 
fell in the z > 1.96, the null hypothesis was rejected at the .05 level.
In summary, data collecAon and research methodology used to test research 
hypotheses of this study were speciAed. Three different types of restaurants were 
segmented. The time Aame of this study was divided into two different periods, which
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represent the 52 weeks prior to the 9/11 events and the 52 weeks alter the 9/11 events. 
Furthermore, the procedure used to estimate beta or systemaAc nsk of a Arm's share and 
how CAR was used were explained. Next, Chapter 4 wiU discuss the results of the testing 
that was descnbed in this chuter.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
IntroducAon
In Chapter 3, the methodology and procedure Ibr data analysis were presented. In 
this chuter, the empirical results fbr this study are discussed and its Endings are 
presented. First, an analysis of CAR is presented. The CAR patterns of each restaurant 
segment and the entire restaurant industry are discussed during the post-event penod. The 
StaAsAcal / test results of the CAR are also presented fbr the explanaAon of the analysis of 
the CAR pattem. Second, the overview of the change in systemaAc nsk of each restaurant 
Arm is addressed. Third, the results of staAsAcal testing of the restaurant beta befbre and 
aAer the 9/11 events are presented. Finally, the study Andings are analyzed and discussed.
Analysis o f CumulaAve Abnormal Retum (CAR)
Figure 2 shows the trend of the S&P 500 index in the pre- and post-9/11 period. 
The S&P 500 index fell markedly during the Ame Aame of this study. Thus, over the 
post-911 penod, there had been net movement downward in the S&P 500 index, which 
means that the average stock market had a negaAve rate of retum. Thus, an economic 
recession might account fbr detenoraAon in the S&P 500 index in the pre- and post-9/11 
penod.
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Figure 2 The S&P 500 Index Befbre and After the 9/11 Events
Figure 3 reports the CAR movement of the fast-fbod restaurant segment in the 
pre- and post-9/11 period. The CAR rose gradually from the 1st week to the 39th week in 
the post-911 period. The positively increasing CAR of the fast-fbod restaurant segment in 
the post-9/11 period means that its actual rate of retum ( ) is higher than its expected
rate of retum (a, + ,) in equation (3.2). An imphcit assumption is that the market
model parameters ( and ^  ) were not afkcted by the 9/11 events in the post-9/11 
period. Thus, the actual rate of retum ( R^ , ) of the fast-fbod restaurant segment was 
relatively higher than the market rate o f retum ( R ,  ^) in the post-911 period. Because the 
market was in decline, with S&P 500 index, showing a negative rate of return, the actual 
rate of retum (R ,,) of the fast-fbod restaurant segment was relatively higher than the
market rate of return ( R ,  ^).Thus, this segment's beta might be decreasing fnm  the 1st
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week to the 39th week in the post-9/11 period. However, the CAR dropped from the 39th 
week until the last week in the post-9/11 period. This might indicate that systematic risk 
was gradually increasing 6om the 39th week to the 52nd week in the post-9/11 period. 
The inconsistent patterns of CAR, which drifted upward and downward after the 9/11 
events, may imply an overall insignificant change in its systematic risk fbr the 52 weeks 
after the 9/11 events.
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Figure 3 Cumulative Abnormal Retum fbr the Fast-Food Restaurants
Figure 4 shows the CAR of the family restaurant segment during the time hame 
of this study period. The CAR of the family restaurant segment in the post-9/11 period 
shows a shghtly different pattem hom that of the fast-fbod segment. As soon as the 9/11 
events occurred, the CAR repeatedly moved downward and iqiward fbr a while. After the 
9/11 events, the CAR declined fbr a couple of weeks, rose fbr 4 weeks, and then dropped
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fbr a couple of weeks again. The CAR started to rise continuously 6om the 9th week to 
the 32nd week, except fbr the 6 weeks j&om the 20th week to the 26th week, then 
declined fbr a couple of weeks and rose again in the 39th week in the post-event period. 
After the 39di week in the post-9/11 period, the CAR gradually decreased until the end of 
the time frame of this study. It is possible that the systematic risk of the family restaurant 
segment was unchanged during 10 weeks after the 9/11 events, gradually declined to the 
32nd week, except fbr the 6 weeks 6om the 20th week to the 26th week, but then rose 
after the 39th week in the post-9/11 period. Thus, in Figure 4, the CAR pattem of the 
family restaurant segment does not show consistent movement in either direction in the 
post-911 period. Because of that, its average beta fbr the 52 weeks might not have 
changed signiAcantly after the 9/11 events.
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Figure 4 Cumulative Abnormal Retum fbr the Family Restaurants
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Based on the CAR patterns in Figures 3 and 4, the systematic risk of the fast-fbod 
and family restaurant segments, which declined but then rose in the post-9/11 period as a 
whole, might not have been fundamentally changed for the entire 52 weeks due to the 
9/11 events. Therefore, these inconsistent movements of the CAR in the fast-fbod and 
family restaurant segments may imply that the 9/11 events did not have enough driving 
fbrce to change the beta characteristics of these two restaurant segments. Overall, the 
fast-fbod and family restaurant segments seem to have experienced a clear "boost" after 
the 9/11 events, probably because their businesses are mainly related to customers' 
spending fbr 'necessity' aiming, whereby might reflect their unchanged beta 
characteristics after the 9/11 events.
Interestingly, compared to that of the fast-fbod and family restaurant segments, 
the CAR of the fine/casual dining segment shows a diSerent pattern. In Figure 5, the 
CAR o f the hne/casual dining segment dropped steeply as soon as the 9/11 events 
occurred, as if  the CAR reflected the direct impact of the 9/11. However, after the 7th 
week in the post-9/11 period, the CAR rose sharply until the 39th week and then started 
to drop continuously until the end of the time 6ame of this study. Thus, the systematic 
risk of the ûne/casual dining restaurant segment experienced an increase, a decrease, and 
then an increase again in the post-911 period. Figure 5 indicates that there is no net 
movement either up or down in the CAR pattern of the fine/casual dining segment in the 
post-911 period. This may also indicate that the 9/11 events did not have enough power 
to change the original beta characteristic of the Gne/casual dining restaurant segment.
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Figure 5 Cumulative Abnormal Return fbr the Fine/Casual Dining Restaurants
Figure 6 reports the CAR of the entire industry as a whole. The CAR pattern of 
the entire restaurant industry in the post-911 period is quite similar to that of the 
Sne/casual dining restaurant segment. In Figure 6, after the 9/11 events, the CAR of the 
entire restaurant industry dropped fbr a while. Because the CAR dropped in the 
Gne/casual dining segment immediately after the 9/11 events, the CAR of the entire 
restaurant industry had a negative value &om the 1st week to the 12th week in the post- 
911 period. However, the CAR of the restaurant industry gradually rose horn the 13th 
week to the 39th week. After the 39th week, the CAR consistently plummeted again until 
the last week of the time frame of this study. According to Figure 6, it is possible that the 
systematic risk of the entire restaurant industry temporally rose fbr a while as soon as the 
9/11 events occurred, then gradually declined 6om the 12th week to the 39th week, and 
rose again 6om the 39th week until the end of the time frame of this study. That may be
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an indication that even though the 9/11 events might have affected the entire restaurant 
industry temporarily, they did not have an impact on the fundamental change in the beta 
characteristic of the entire restaurant industry in the post-9/11 period.
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Figure 6 Cumulative Abnormal Return fbr the Entire Restaurant Industry
In order to measure the effects of the 9/11 events on restaurant firms' securities, 
Table 3 reports the results of t tests used to identic whether the estimated CAR of the 
post-9/11 period is signihcantly difkrent 6om zero. The weeks +5, +10, +15, +20, +25, 
+30, +35, +40, +45, and +52 were chosen to see whether the estimated CARs are 
significantly dif&rent hom zero on each selected week and to identify whether the 
statistical results are consistent with the CAR pattern of each restaurant segment and far 
the entire restaurant industry.
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In the fast-fbod restaurant segment, the CAR was signihcantly different hrom zero 
in the weeks +15, +20, +25, +30, +35, +40, and +45 (CAR 15: t = 1.748,p = 0.094; CAR 
20: f = 2.409,p = 0.025; CAR 25: t = 2.410,p = 0.025; CAR 30: t = 3.298,p = 0.003; 
CAR 35: f = 2.904,p = 0.008; CAR 40: t =3.000,p = 0.007; CAR 45: t = 1.849,p = 
0.078). The CAR fbr these weeks, which is signihcantly different 6om zero, might be 
evidence of the effects of the 9/11 events. The CAR being signihcantly different hom 
zero in the +15, +20, +25, +30, +35, +40, and +45 weeks might reflect the CAR's upward 
drift in the fast-fbod restaurant segment after the 9/11 events, as shown in Figure 3. 
However, the CAR was not signiGcantly different hom zero in the weeks +5, +10, and 
+52 (CAR 5:f = 0.718,p = 0.480; CAR 10: f = 0.750,p = 0.461; CAR 52: 1.055,p =
0.303). The insignificant fast-fbod CAR of 52 in Table 3 might reflect the fast-fbod 
CAR's persistent drop after the 39th week in the post-9/11 period in Figure 3. It is 
interesting that the CAR is significantly different 6om zero in the weeks +15, +20, +25, 
+30, +35, +40, and +45, but is not in the week +52 in the post-9/11 period. In Figure 3, 
the CAR did not continuously drift either upward or downward but moved up and down 
in the post-911 period. I f  the CAR had moved up consistently until the end of the time 
hame of this study in the post-911 period, then the fast-fbod CAR of 52 in Table 3 would 
have been significantly different horn zero. Thus, these statistical results of the fast-fbod 
segment in Table 3 are consistent with the CAR pattern of the fast-fbod restaurant 
segment in Figure 3, which does not show continuous net movement either up or down. 
This consistency between the statistical results and the CAR patterns may indicate that 
the s)%tematic risk of the fast-fbod restaurant segment was not signihcantly changed after 
the 9/11 events.
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The CAR of the family restaurant segment was signiGcantly different Grom zero in 
the weeks +30 and+35 (CAR 30: 1.752,p = 0.100; CAR 35: t = 1.873,p = 0.081).
The signiGcant family restaurant CAR of 30 and family restaurant CAR of 35 in Table 3 
might mirror the CAR's move-up in the family restaurant segment aAer the 9/11 events in 
Figure 4. However, the CAR fbr this segment was not signiGcantly different Grom zero in 
the weeks +5, +10, +15, +20, +25, +40, +45, and +52 (CAR 5: i = 0.317,p = 0.756; CAR 
10:r = -0.130,p = 0.899; CAR 15 : i = 0.773, p = 0.451 ; CAR 20: i = 1.320, p = 0.207; 
CAR 25: r = 0.962, p = 0.351; CAR 40: i=1.530,p = 0.147; CAR 45: i = 0.737,p =
0.472; CAR 52: r = 0.269, p = 0.792). The non-signiGcant family restaurant CARs of the 
weeks 5,10,15, and 20 in Table 3 might reGect the CAR's moves up-and-down fbr a 
while right after the 9/11 events in Figure 4. The insigniGcant family restaurant CARs of 
40,45, and 52 might reGect the family restaurant CAR's drop after the 39th week in the 
post-911 period in Figure 4. In Figure 4, the CAR in the fannly restaurant segment 
repeatedly driAed downward and upward until the 9th week aAer the 9/11 events. Then it 
gradually rose until the 39th week but, aAer that, it plummeted unGl the last week of the 
time frame of this study. The statisGcal results are also consistent with the CAR pattern of 
the family restaurant segment in Figure 4, which driAed upward and downward. Thus, the 
staGsGcal results of the farmly restaurant segment might represent that its average 
systemaGc nsk was not signiGcanGy changed due to the 9/11 events.
In the Gne/casual dining restaurant segment, the CAR was signiGcanGy different 
Aom zero in the weeks +5, +10, +30, +35, and +40 (CAR 5: f = -4.374,p = 0.000; CAR 
10: i = -1.705,p = 0.100; CAR 30: t = 2.462,p = 0.021; CAR 35: t = 2.421,p = 0.022; 
CAR 40: r =2.463, p = 0.020). The signiGcant CAR in the weeks +5 and +10 in Table 3
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might reGect the CAR's plummet right aAer the 9/11 events in the Gne/casual dining 
restaurant segment, but weeks +30, +35, and +40 mirror the CAR's gradual ascent. 
However, the CAR was not signiGcantly diGèrent Aom zero in weeks +15, +20, +25, 
+45, and +52 (CAR 15: i = 0.046,p = 0.963; CAR 20: i = 1.404, p = 0.172; CAR 25: i = 
1.037,p = 0.309; CAR 45: t = 0.734,p = 0.469; CAR 52: f = 0.094,p = 0.926). The non- 
signiGcant Gne/casual dining CARs of 15,20, and 25 in Table 3 might reGect the 
recovery Aom the drop of the Gne/casual dining restaurant segment right after the 9/11 
events in Figure 5. The CAR's continuous plummet after the 39th week might have 
caused the non-signiGcant Gne/casual dining CARs of 45 and 52. In the Gne/casual 
dining restaurant segment, statisGcal results in Table 3 are consistent with the CAR 
patterns in the post-9/11 period in Figure 5. Thus, these staGsGcal results might also 
indicate that the average systemaGc risk of the Gne/casual dining restaurant segment was 
not signiGcanGy changed after the 9/11 events.
In the entAe restaurant industry, the CAR was signiGcantly different Aom zero in 
the weeks +5, +20, +25, +30, +35, +40, and +45 (CAR 5: r = -1.667,p = 0.100; CAR 20: 
i = 3.040,p = 0.003; CAR 25: f = 2.574,p = 0.012; CAR 30: i = 4.405,p = 0.000; CAR 
35: i = 4.247,p = 0.000; CAR 40: t = 4.147,p = 0.000; CAR 45: i = 1.968,p = 0.053). 
The signiGcant CAR in week +5 might reGect the CAR's r^ id  plummet aAer the 9/11 
events, but in weeks +20, +25,+30, +35,+40, and +45 it might mirror the CAR's 
continuous ascent in the entire restaurant industry aAer the 9/11 events. However, the 
CAR of the entire restaurant industry was not signiGcanGy different Aom zero in weeks 
+10, +15, and+52 (CAR 10: i = -0.989,p = 0.326; CAR 15: 1.350,p = 0.182; CAR
52: i = 0.872, p = 0.386). The non-signiGcant CAR in week +52 might reGect the CAR's
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continuoiis drop aAer the 39th week. In the entire restaurant industry, the staGsGcal 
results of this study suppoA the explanaGon Air the CAR paAems because they are 
consistent with the CAR paAem of the entire restaurant industry in the post-9/11 period. 
In summary, the staGsGcal i tests results in Table 3 are generally consistent with the CAR 
paAems of each restaurant segment and of the enthe restaurant industry in the post-9/11 
penod. According to the staGsGcal results in Table 3, the change in average systemaGc 
nsk may not be signiGcant Air each restaurant segment, or Air the entire restaurant 
industry in pre-and post-911 period.
Table 3
T Test for CAR diGerence bv week
Type rvalue # f  (2-tail Sig.)
Fast-Food CAR 5 0.718 22 0.480
Family Rest CAR 5 0.317 15 0.756
Fine/Casual Dining CAR 5 -4.374 27 0.000***
Entire Restaurant CAR 5 -1.667 66 0.100*
Fast-Food CAR 10 0.750 22 0.461
Family Rest CAR 10 -0.130 15 0.899
Fine/Casual Dining CAR 10 -1.705 27 0.100*
EnGre Restaurant CAR 10 -0.989 66 0.326
Fast-Food CAR 15 1.748 22 0.094*
Family Rest CAR 15 0.773 15 0.451
Fine/Casual Dining CAR 15 0.046 27 0.963
Entire Restaurant CAR 15 1.350 66 0.182
Fast-Food CAR 20 2.409 22 0.025**
Family Rest CAR 20 1.320 15 0.207
Fine/Casual Dining CAR 20 1.404 27 0.172
Entire Restaurant CAR 20 3.040 66 0.003***
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Table 3 (Continued)
TTest for the CAR difference bv week
Type rvalue 4T f  (2-tail Sig.)
Fast-Food CAR 25 2.410 22 0.025**
Family Rest CAR 25 0.962 15 0.351
Fine/Casual Dming CAR 25 1.037 27 0.309
Entire Restaurant CAR 25 2.574 66 0.012**
Fast-Food CAR 30 3.298 22 0.003**
Family Rest CAR 30 1.752 15 0.100*
Fine/Casual Dining CAR 30 2.462 27 0.021**
Entire Restaurant CAR 30 4.405 66 0.000***
Fast-Food CAR 35 2.904 22 0.008***
Family Rest CAR 35 1.873 15 0.081*
Fine/Casual Dining CAR 35 2.421 27 0.022**
Entire Restaurant CAR 35 4.247 66 0.000***
Fast-Food CAR 40 3.000 22 0.007***
Family Rest CAR 40 1.530 15 0.147
Fine/Casual Dining CAR 40 2.463 27 0.020**
Entire Restaurant CAR 40 4.147 66 0.000***
Fast-Food CAR 45 1.849 22 0.078*
Family Rest CAR 45 0.737 15 0.472
Fine/Casual Dining CAR 45 0.734 27 0.469
Entire Restaurant CAR 45 1.968 66 0.053*
Fast-Food CAR 52 1.055 22 0.303
Family Rest CAR 52 0.269 15 0.792
Fine/Casual Dining CAR 52 0.094 27 0.926
Entire Restaurant CAR 52 0.872 66 0.386
Abre. The data is based on the 2-year period 2000-2002. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, < 0.01.
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Overview, of the Changes in Systematic Risk 
Table 4 provides descripGve staGsGcs of both the pre- and post-9/11 beta fbr the 
entire restaurant industry and each of three restaurant segments. The objecGve of 
providing the descripGve staGsGcs of each restaurant segment's beta and the entire 
restaurant industry's beta during the analysis penod is to proGle and summarize the 
overall change in systemaGc nsk after the 9/11 events. In Table 4, the sample shows that 
the mean beta declined after the 9/11 events in the entire restaurant industry 6om 0.56 to
0.51. The decline of mean beta in the fast-fbod restaurant segment was largest, horn 0.67 
to 0.47. The mean beta of the family restaurant segment also declined from 0.51 to 0.39. 
However, (he mean beta of the Gne/casual dining restaurant segment increased shghGy 
Gom 0.50 to 0.62 after the 9/11 events. This result might be reGected by both substanGal 
negaGve declines of CAR fbr a Gme n ^ t aAer the 9/11 events and (he continuous decline 
of the CAR after the 39th week in the Gne/casual dining restaurant segment in the post- 
9/1 1 penod.
Table 4
DescnnGve StaGsGcs of Beta fbr the Restaurant Industrv and Three Restaurant 
Segments in the Pre-9/11 and (he Post-9/11 Penod
Mean Stanckrd Minimum Maximum
DeviaGonType --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
9/11 9/11 9/11 9/11 9/11 9/11 9/11 9/11
Restaurant industry 0.56 0.51 0.52 0.45 -0.45 -0.54 2.08 2.18
Fast-fbod 0.67 0.47 0.62 0.39 -0.45 -0.54 2.08 1.16
Family 0.51 0.39 0.41 0.37 -0.36 -0.23 1.21 1.04
Fine/Casual dining 0.50 0.62 0.48 0.50 -0.26 -0.16 1.88 2.18
Ab/g. The data is based on the 2-year penod 2000-2002.
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In Table 5, each restaurant Arm's beta during the pre- and post-9/11 period is 
estimated over the 52 weeks of each period by the single index model in equahon (3.1). 
As Table 5 shows, restaurant stocks are generally regarded as low-risk (defensive) stocks 
because most restaurant betas over the 2-year period 2000-2002 were much lower than 
one. In Table 5, the betas of pre-9/11 in the entire restaurant industry are slightly higher 
than those of the post-9/11. The betas of 30 Arms out of the total sample increased aAer 
the 9/11 events. However, the betas of the 37 companies out of the total sample decreased 
in the post-9/11 period. In the Ane/casual dining restaurant segment, the betas of 13 Arms 
decreased, and 15 Arms' betas increased aAer the 9/11 events. The betas of 11 Arms out 
of the family restaurant segment decreased, and only A)ur companies' betas increased 
after the 9/11 events. In the fast-fbod restaurant segment, 13 Arms' betas dropped and 10 
increased aAer the 9/11 events. Both in the pre- and post-9/11 period, eight Arms out of 
the total sample (the pre-9/11 period: BNHN, CHGO, CHUX, TENT, ARKR, LTUS, 
BUNZ, PZZI, and fbe post-9/11 period: GRIL, STRZ, EATS, ELMS, GTIM, NATH, 
PZZL QDIN) had a negaAve beta, which usually indicates that when the market return 
increases, the return of an individual stock decreases, and vice versa (FemAndez, 2002).
Table 5
Restaurant Firms' Beta Values fbr the Pre-9/11 and the Post-9/11 Period
Type of Restaurant Symbol Pre-9/11 beta Post-9/11 beta
Fine/Casual Dining 1. APPB 0.381 0.367
Restaurants 2. CAKE 1.032 0.724
(28)
3.BNHN -0.164" 0.115
4. EAT 0.803 0.496
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Table 5 (Continued)
Restaurant Firm's Beta Values fbr the Pre-9/11 and the Post-9/11 Period
Type o f Restaurant Symbol Pre-9/11 beta Post-9/11 beta
5. BUCK 0.830 2.178
6.CMPP 0.005 0.478
7. CHGO -0.258" 0.805
8.D R I 0.461 0.429
9. DAB 0.711 0.236
10. GCFBU 0.795 0.148
11. GRIL 1.877 -0.100^
12.LNY 0.812 0.927
13. STAR 0.665 0.982
14. MAIN 0.100 0.577
15. CASA 0.809 0.703
Fine/Casual Dining 16. CHUX -0.150" 0.334
17. OSI 0.437 0.709
Restaurants
18. RARE 0.292 0.922
(28) 19.RUB0 0.583 0.689
20. RI 0.296 0.729
21. SZ 0.337 1.077
22. STRZ 0.541 -0.155*
23. TENT -0.056" 1.738
24.TWED 0.881 0.222
25. BDL 0.151 0.102
26. PFCB 1.255 0.790
27. JAX 0.596 0.523
28. ARKR -0.112" 0.708
Family Restaurants 29IHP 0.705 0.374
(15) 30. SNS 0.332 0.556
31. RYAN 0.416 0.932
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Table 5 (Continued)
Restaurant Firm's Beta Values fbr the Pre-9/11 and the Post-9/11 Period
Type of Restaurant Symbol Pre-9/11 beta Post-9/11 beta
32. BOBE 0.166 0.729
33. CPKI 1.085 1.035
34. CBRL 0.908 0.215
35. CEC 0.447 0.130
Family Restaurants 36. EATS 0.152 -0.152*
37. ELMS 0.109 -0.234*
(15) 38. DAVE 1.206 0.157
39. SALD 0.711 0.151
40. LTUS -0.363" 0.010
41.LUB 0.606 0.836
42.MAXE 0.168 0.046
43. PIC 0.738 0.693
44. FRN 0.699 0.500
45. JBX 0.821 0.320
46.MCD 0.334 0.696
47. WEN 0.544 0.533
48. BUNZ -0.446" 0.548
49.CKR 1.510 1.155
Fast-fbod Restaurants 50.CHKR 0.793 0.941
51. YUM 0.946 0.476
(23) 52. AGL 0.158 0.675
53. BYBI 0.439 0.848
54. DDRX 2.080 0.650
55.FRS 0.052 0.403
56. GTIM 0.785 -0.544*
57.KKD 1.790 0.501
58.MHG 0.402 0.613
59. MR 0.738 0.064
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Table 5 (Continued)
Restaurant Finn's Beta Values fbr the Pre-9/11 and the Post-9/11 Period
Type of Restaurant Symbol Pre-9/11 beta Post-9/11 beta
60. NATH 0.083 -0.035*
61.PNRA 1.173 0.780
62.PZZA 0.862 0.461
63. PZZI -0.127" -0.003*
Fast-fbod Restaurants 64. QDIN 0.361 -0.073*
(23) 65. SONC 0.367 0.494
66. SBUX 1.435 0.994
67. TRY 0.360 0.364
Abfg. The data is based on the 2-year period 2000-2002. Number in parenthesis indicates the 
number of firms in this segment included in the sample fbr this study. " represents a negative beta 
in the pre-9/11 period. * represents a negative beta in the post-9/11 period.
Test Results
The results of the paired sample r test were used to idenhfy whether the estimated 
pre-9/11 beta of the restaurant industry differed staGstically signiAcanGy Gom its 
estimated post-9/11 beta. Table 6 shows the results of the paired sample r test of the 
entire restaurant industry, the casual/Ane dining restaurant segment, the family restaurant 
segment, and the fast-fbod restaurant segment. The research hypothesis (Ha) is not 
siqrported because the r staGsGc (f = 0.605, p = 0.547) fbr the beta of the entire restaurant 
industry was not staGsGcally signiGcant at the 0.05 level. Hg states that the post-9/11 beta 
of the entire restaurant industry is signiGcanGy different Gom its pre-9/11 beta. This 
result explicitly shows that the post-9/11 beta of the entire restaurant industry is not 
staGsGcahy different Gom its pre-9/11 beta at the 0.05 level of signiAcance.
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Table 6
Paired Sample T Test fbr the Entire Restaurant Industrv and Three Restaurant Segments
Industry /-value 4T f  (2-tail Sig.)
The entire restaurant industry 0.605 66 0.547
Fine/Casual dining restaurants -0.918 27 0.367
Family restaurants 1.193 15 0.251
Fast-fbod restaurants 1.581 22 0.128
/Vbfe. The data is based on the 2-year period 2000-2002.
The research hypothesis (H*i) is also not supported, because the t statistic value (r 
= -0.918,/) = 0.367) fbr the beta of the Ane/casual dining restaurant segment was not 
staAsAcally signiAcant at the 0.05 level of signiAcance. Hai stated that the post-9/11 beta 
of the Ane/casual dining restaurant segment is signiAcantly different Aom its pre-9/11 
beta. This result clearly presents that the post-9/11 beta of the Ane/casual dining 
restaurant segment was not staAsAcally different Aom its pre-9/11 beta at the 0.05 level 
of signiAcance.
The research hypothesis (H,;) is rejected because the f staAsAc value (i =1.193, p 
= 0.251) fbr the beta of the family restaurant segment was not staAstically signiAcant at 
the 0.05 level. H ,2  stated that the post-9/11 beta of the family restaurant segment is 
significantly different Aom its pre-9/11 beta. This result explicidy indicates that the post- 
9/1 1 beta of the family restaurant segment was considered the same value as its pre-9/11 
beta at the 0.05 level.
The research hypothesis (Hgs) is also rejected, because the t staAsAc value (/ = 
1.581,p = 0.128) fbr the beta of the fast-fbod restaurant segment was not staAsAcally 
signiAcant at the 0.05 level. Hgs stated that the post-9/11 beta of the fast fbod restaurant
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segment is not signiAcanÜy different Aom its pre-9/11 beta. This result clearly shows that 
the post-9/11 beta of the fast-fbod restaurant segment was not staAsAcally different Aom 
its pre-9/11 beta at the 0.05 level.
The results of the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test fbr the entire restaurant industry 
and three restaurant segments are shown in Table 7. The entire restaurant industry, with 
33.11 negaAve ranks and 35.10 posiAve ranks, shows that the minimum sum of ranks is 
1225 fbr the negaAve ranks and is 1053 fbr the posiAve ranks. The mean rank reported in 
the test data table is computed by dividing the sum of ranks total by the number of 
negaAve or posiAve ranks. Thep value (p = 0.591) fbr the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
of the entire restaurant industry imphes that the research hypothesis (Hg) is not supported 
at the 0.05 level. Therefbre, the post-9/11 beta of the entire restaurant industry is not 
sigmAcanAy different Aom its pre-9/11 beta. As a result, it clearly shows that there is no 
signiAcant change in average beta fbr the entire restaurant industry after the 9/11 events.
In the Ane/casual dming restaurant segment, with 12.12 negaAve ranks and 16.57 
posiAve ranks, the minimum sum of ranks is 157.50 A r the negaAve ranks and is 248.50 
Ar Ae posiAve ranks. Thep value (p = 0.300) Ar Ae Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test of Ae 
Ane/casual dining restaurant segment implies that Ae research hypoAesis (Hgi) is 
rejected at Ae 0.05 level. ThereAre, Ae post-9/11 beta of Ae Ane/casual dining 
restaurants is not signiAcantly different Aom its pre-9/11 beta. This result clearly shows 
that Aere is no signiAcant change m average beta A r Ae Ane/casual dining restaurant 
segment after Ae 9/11 events.
55
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table?
The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test Ar Ae Entire Restaurant Adustrv and Three Restaurant
Segments
The Entire Restaurants N Mean Rank Sum ofRanks W SAAsAc f  Value
NegaAve Ranks 37 33.11 1225 -0.537 0.591
PosiAve Ranks 30 35.10 1053
Ties 0
Total 67
Fme/Casual Dining N Mean Rank Sum ofRanks W SAAsAc f  Value
NegaAve Ranks 13 12.12 157.50 -1.036 0.300
PosiAve Ranks 15 16.57 248.50
Ties 0
Total 28
Family ResAurants N Mean Rank Sum ofRanks W StaAsAc f  Value
NegaAve Ranks 11 8.00 88 -1.034 0.301
PosiAve Ranks 5 9.60 48
Ties 0
Total 16
Fast-Food Restaurants N Mean Rank Sum ofRanks W StaAsAc f  Value
NegaAve Ranks 13 14.15 184 -1.399 0.162
PosiAve Ranks 10 9.20 92
Ties 0
Total 23
The data is based on Ae 2-year period 2000-2002. Negative ranks mean the post-9/11 beta 
is less than the pre-9/11 beta. Positive ranks mean Ae post-9/11 beta is greater than Ae pre-9/11 
beta. Ties mean Ae post-9/11 beta is equal to Ae pre-9/11 beta.
A  Ae fiamily restaurant segment, wiA 8 negaAve ranks and 9.6 posiAve ranks, Ae 
minimum sum of ranks is 88 A r Ae negaAve ranks and is 48 Ar Ae posiAve ranks. The p 
value (p = 0.301) Ar Ae Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test of Ae family restaurant segment 
implies that Ae research hypoAesis (ILa) is not supported at Ae 0.05 level. ThereAre, Ae
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post-9/11 beA of Ae family resAurants is not signiGcantly Afferent Gom iA pre-9/11 
beA As a result, Aere was no fundamental change m average beta of Ae family 
restaurant segment aAer Ae 9/11 evenA.
A  Ae fast-fbod resAurant segment, wiA 14.15 negaGve ranks and 9.20 posiGve 
ranks, Ae minimum sum of ranks is 184 Ar Ae negaGve ranks used Ar Ae Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks Test. The p value (p = 0.162) Ar Ae Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test implies 
that Ae research hypoAesis (Hgs) is not supported at Ae 0.05 level. ThereAre, Ae post- 
9/1 1 average beA of Ae fast-fbod resAurant was not signiGcanGy AfArent Gom iA pre- 
9/11 beta.
A  summary, when it comes to comparing average betas, Ae paired sample / test 
and Ae WGcoxon Signed Ranks Test show that one must accept Ae hypoAeses that Ae 
pre- and post-9/11 betas are equal A r Ae entire restaurant mdustry and each restaurant 
segment. ThereAre, Aese resulA can be considered as strong evidence that Aere was no 
signiGcant impact of Ae 9/11 evenA on Ae systemaGc nsk of Ae entire restaurant 
mdustry, nor on that of each restaurant segment.
Summary
A  general, resAurant stocks are recognized as defensive (low-nsky) stocks 
because Aeir Grms' average beA values over Ae 2-year period 2000-2002 are much less 
than one. Due A  an economic recession over Ae 2-year period, Ae S&P 500 mdex 
conGnuously dropped durmg Ae Gme Game of Gns study. BoA Ae CAR pattern and Ae 
resulA of Ae CAR's / tesA m Ae enAe restaurant mdustry and A  each restaurant
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segment suggest Aat Ae 9/11 evenA Ad not have an impact on Ae fundamental change 
m Ae beta characterisGc of Ae resAurant mdustry m Ae post-9/11 period.
The resulA of the paired sample / test show that Ae post-9/11 beta was not 
staGsGcaUy Afferent Gom Ae pre-9/11 beA m Ae entire resAurant mdustry and each 
categorized resAurant segment. Also, Ae resAts of Ae WGcoxon Signed Ranks Test are 
consistent wiA Ae previous resulA of Ae paired sample / test.
This chuter has presented Ae Gndings and resulA of this sAdy. The next chuter 
presenA a summary of this sAdy and Ascusses Ae implicaGons of Ae tesA of Ae 
hypoAeses, and presenA an agenda Ar Ature sAdy.
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CHAPTERS
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Summaiy
The primary purpose of this study was A  investigate whether Ae systematic risk 
of Ae restaurant mdustry was signiGcanGy changed aAer Ae evenA of 9/11. More 
speciGcally, this sAdy's objecGve was to mvesGgaA Ae change m systemaGc nsk of 
three types of restauranA, mcluding Ae Gne/casual dining, family, and fast-fiaod 
resAurant segmenA, aAer Ae 9/11 evenA. The sAdy mvesGgated 67 restaurant 
companies whose shares were traded on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during Ae 52 
weeks pnor and Ae 52 weeks aAer Ae 9/11 evenA. Twenty-three restauranA were 
mcluded m Ae fast-fbod restaurant segment. The family restaurant segment consisted of 
16 Grms. Twenty-eight compames were mcluded m Ae Gne/casual dining resAurant 
segment. Thus, Ae Atal number of Grms mcluded m Ae study was 77.
According A  Ae CAR patterns m Figures 4.2 through 4.5 and Ae staGsGcal 
resulA of Ae CAR / test m Table 3, Ae change m systemaGc nsk may not be signiGcant, 
eiAer m each restaurant segment or m Ae enAe restaurant industry. The restaurant 
stocks' mean beA is 0.56 over Ae 52 weeks m Ae pre-9/11 period and is 0.51 m Ae post- 
911 period. Based on Ae resulA of descripGve staGsGcs, all of Ae resAuranA experienced 
a slight decrease m beA after Ae evenA of 9/11. The fast-fbod and family restaurant 
segmenA also experienced declines m Aeir average beA values after Ae 9/11 evenA.
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However, Ae average beA value m Ae jEine/casual dining resAurant segment slighGy 
mcreased aAer Ae 9/11 events. During Ae 2-year period 2000-2002, resAurant stocks 
could be characterized as defiensive stocks (low risk) on Ae whole. This risk proAle is 
probably characterized by less sensiGvity to Ae exogenous environment, such as Ae 
economic growA rate, Ae inAaGon rate, recession, or acA of terronsm.
The resulA of Ae paired sample / test and Ae Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test show 
that Ae post-9/11 beA was not staGsGcally AAerent Aom Ae pre-9/11 beA Ar Ae entire 
resAurant industry, or by each categorized restaurant segment. Because Ae entire 
restaurant mdustry and each type of resAurant segment Ad not expenence a fundamental 
change m beta, it is possible that Ae resulA reGected Ae stability of restaurant Arms' 
betas due A  qmckly rebounding and mcreased sales m Ae restaurant mdustry; Aus, a 
structural shiA precipiAted by Ae 9/11 evenA evidenüy Ad not occur. According to Ae 
NRA (2002), m Ae 6 months Allowing Ae 9/11 evenA, Ae restaurant mdustry continued 
to recover Aom Ae impact of Aese evenA. AlAough Ae resAurant mdustry was affected 
by Ae terronst attacks and an economic recession, iA sales had rebounded A pre-attack 
levels by November 2001. A  December 2001, resAurant-industry sales jumped above 
pre-attack levels, posting a single-monA sales record of $ 28.4 bülion. A  2001, 
restaurant-industry sales had an mcrease of 0.8 percent on an inGaGon-adjusted basis. 
AAer Ae 9/11 events, resAurant-industry sales mcreased 1.3 percent m 2002 (NaGonal 
Restaurant AssociaGon, 2003). Due to Ae resiliency of Ae restaurant mdustry, Ae 
restaurant mdustry was able A minimize Ae eGecA of Ae 9/11 evenA. In oAer words,
Ae 9/11 evenA Ad not AmdamentaGy impact resAurant customers' psychological 
behavior. Restaurant customers continued eaGng out aAer Ae 9/11 evenA. This powerAil
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Gnding demonstrates Aat Ae US resAurant mdustry is mdeed resAent, which has 
potenGally important implicadon Ar resAurant manager and mvestor. ThereAre, Ae 
resilient resAurant mdustry was able to experience a recovery and mcreased sales aAer 
9/11. Due to Ae mcreased sales m Ae resAurant mdustry, Ae beA might not have 
changed aAer 9/11.
Conclusions 
The conclusions of this study are as AGows:
1. Restaurant stocks are generally deAnsive (low risky) stocks m comparison to the 
market;
2. The post-9/11 beA is not signiGcanGy AfArent Gom Ae pre-9/11 beA Ar Ae 
enAe resAurant mdustry and each segment of resAurant, such as Ae Gne/casual 
dining resAurant, Ae famüy resAurant, and Ae fast-Gx»d resAurant;
3. The unchanged beA might reGect recovered sales and mcreased sales m Ae post- 
9/1 1 period. ThereAre, Ae change m beA might not be signiGcant; and,
4. Even Aough Ae 9/11 evenA might have an impact on Ae restaurant mdustry 
temporarily, Aey do not have enou^i driving Arce to change Ae beA 
characterisGc Ar Ae 52 weeks after Ae evenA of 9/11.
ImpGcaGons of Ae Study 
The nsk feature unaGected by an exogenous environment m Ae restaurant 
mdustry may have important impGcaGons A r mvesArs and execuGves of Ae hospitality 
mdustry. This sAdy shows that Ae restaurant mdustry w ^  generaGy characterized by
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low risk during Ae period 2000-2002. FurAermore, Ae post-9/11 beA of Ae enAe 
restaurant mdustry and each resAurant mdustry segment is not sAhsGcally Afferent Grom 
Ae pre-9/11 beA. These resulA are probably due to Ae resihency of Ae resAurant 
mdustry. Thus, Ae restaurant mdustry recovered its sales far more qmckly and at a much 
faster pace Aan Ad oAer mdustries aAer Ae 9/11 terrorist attacks (Nolt & Foulkes,
2003).
According to Ae AeoreGcal Gramework of CAPM (LmAer, 1965; Sharpe, 1963, 
1964), a Arm's systemaGc nsk is Ae risk related to Ae capital markets, raAer Aan to Ae 
Grms itself. Therefbre, beta, which measures systemaGc nsk, inGuences Ae mvesArs' 
required rate of return. The higher Ae beta, Ae higher Ae required rate of return and 
hence Ae lower Ae stock value Ar an existing shareholder. The lower Ae beta, Ae lower 
Ae required rate of return and hence Ae higher Ae stock value Ar Ae existing 
shareholder. Based on an improved understanding of Ae unchanged nsk of Ae restaurant 
mdustry m Ae wake of the 9/11 events, restaurant mvesArs and portAho managers wiA  
restaurant shares can use restaurant stocks as buffers A offset high nsk stocks and A  
create a more efBcient mvestment portAho.
Management is concerned wiA maximizing wealA; AereAre, it needs A consider 
Ae relaGonship between decisions and risk. The cost of capital depends on nsk. 
ThereAre, coital structure decisions are dependent on risk. Based on Ae knowledge of 
Ae unchanged risk feature m Ae restaurant mdustry aGer Ae 9/11 events, restaurant 
management can make more competent and aggressive capital decisions that can mcrease 
systemaGc nsk, such as Ae adAGon of new services, expansion of exisGng services, debt 
Gnancial leverage. Its quick recovery G"om Ae 9/11 events implies low busmess nsk Ar
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restaurant Grms. ThereAre, aggressive restaurant owners can afArd to take more 
Gnancial risk by mcreasmg leverage. Because interest rates are currenGy at very low 
levels, increasing a Grm's debt wül likely lower its overall cost of capital.
RecommendaGons Ar Future Research 
In order to invesGgate Ae impact of Ae exogenous environment such as Ae 9/11 
events on Ae hospitahty mdustry, Ature sAAes can extend Ae time Game by collecting 
monthly stock pnces instead of weekly stock prices. Numerous empincal sAAes have 
used 60-monA stock prices to estimate beta. ThereAre, m order to generalize Ae resAts 
of beA esGmaGon, beA can be estimated over 60 months m Ae pre- and post-9/11 period 
Ar Ature sAAes.
Finally, Ae study can be extended to oAer hospitality mdustry sectors such as 
hotels, gammg Grms, and airhne companies. Because Aey have AfArent characterisGcs, 
Ae impact of changes m Ae exogenous environment on Aem may AfAr. Thus, m order 
to mvesGgate Ae impact of Ae 9/11 evenA on Ae hospitality mdustry as a whole, each 
hospitality segment will need A  be Ascussed m Ature sAAes.
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